division_name: Investigatory Powers (Amendment)Bill [Lords] &#8212; New Clause 1 - Report on the Prime Minister&#8217;s engagement with the Intelligence and Security Committee
motion: <p class="indent" pid="b1302.5/73" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;has the necessary operational awareness to decide whether&#8221;</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1302.5/75" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;is either required in their routine duties to issue warrants under section 19 or section 102 or has the necessary operational experience&#8221;.</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1302.5/86" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;has the necessary operational awareness to decide whether&#8221;</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1302.5/88" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;is required in their routine duties to issue warrants under section 19 or section 102 or has the necessary operational experience&#8221;.</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1312.2/14" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;The Agencies also suggested, planned or agreed to rendition operations proposed by others in 28 cases. We have seen a further 22 cases where SIS or MI5 provided intelligence to enable a rendition operation to take place; and 23 cases where they failed to take action to prevent a rendition&#8221;.</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1312.2/18" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment&#8221;.</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1319.3/3" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment&#8221;.</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1320.1/3" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;require members of a relevant legislature who are targets of interception to be notified after the fact, as long as it does not compromise any ongoing investigation.&#8221;</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1321.1/3" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;remove the ability of the Secretary of State to authorise the interception of the communications of, or the obtaining of communications intended for, or private information belonging to, Members of Parliament.&#8221;</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1326.0/2" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;The Judicial Commissioner, on reviewing any notifications received under subsection (2), must cancel the category authorisation if the Commissioner considers that section 226A no longer applies to any dataset that falls within the category of datasets&#8221;.</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1326.1/5" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;such queries are highly susceptible to imprecise construction&#8221;</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1326.1/9" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;would dramatically disrupt the global market for security technologies, putting users in the UK and around the world at greater risk.&#8221;</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1326.1/11" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;not intended as an approval mechanism&#8221;</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1326.1/13" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;Once a company is compelled to provide notice of a new security technology to the SoS, the SoS can immediately seek a Technical Capability Notice to block the technology.&#8221;</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1332.7/5" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;Unless a man becomes the enemy of an evil, he will not even become its slave but rather its champion.&#8221;</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1337.3/6" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;In addition to the concerns of civil society, I would like to draw your attention to some of the comments submitted in evidence to the Bill&#8217;s Committee from the tech industry.</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1337.3/7" pwmotiontext="yes">Apple: &#8216;In addition to impacting the safety of billions of users around the world who rely on security technologies developed by Apple and other companies, the Bill in its current form would undermine fundamental human rights. In fact, just this year, the European Court of Human Rights held that requiring a company to provide a means to decrypt all encrypted communications on its platform violated the right of privacy in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.&#8217;</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1337.3/8" pwmotiontext="yes">TechUK: &#8216;This could impede the ability of TechUK members to modify products and services over time to protect users from active security threats, to innovate, and enhance their services for their users.&#8217;</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1337.3/9" pwmotiontext="yes">Information Technology Industry Council: &#8216;We strongly encourage greater scrutiny of these implications so that the Bill will not have a chilling effect on a company&#8217;s ability to conduct business or in current or future innovations, and that it will serve to further international efforts on shared goals around trust and security.&#8217;</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1337.3/10" pwmotiontext="yes">Computer and Communications Industry Association: &#8216;Over time, this will push tech firms to refocus product development away from addressing the priorities of UK consumers, towards Government demands for access. The obstacles the new regime creates will be a drag on innovation and therefore undermine the quality of digital services on offer.&#8217;&#8221;</p>
  
  <p class="indent" pid="b1338.1/3" pwmotiontext="yes">&#8220;They could risk deterring investment in improving service for UK consumers and contribute to a sense that the UK is not a safe market in which to invest.&#8221;</p>